w(P T ) without a cut-o¤ between the gain-space and the loss-space exists, then there exists an alternative contract that strictly dominates the candidate contract e w(P T ), so that e w(P T ) cannot be optimal. If there is no cut-o¤ value that separates the loss space from the gain space, then there exists a unique point e P 2 (0; 1) such that the probability that the contract pays out in the gain space below e P is positive and equal to the probability that the contract pays out in the loss space above e P . We denote both probabilities by s:
s R e P 0 l(P T )f (P T jb e)dP T = R 1 e P (1 l(P T ))f (P T jb e)dP T > 0: (IA.4) e P exists because f (P T jb e) is continuous in P T . Now we construct an alternative contract, where we exchange the gains to the left of e P with the losses to the right of e P . More precisely, we replace the gains below e P by the lowest possible loss w, and all losses above e P by a constant payout in the gain space w that is chosen such that the costs of the new contract and the original candidate contract e w to the …rm are identical: w 1 s R e P 0 w G (P T )l(P T )f (P T jb e)dP T w R : (IA.5) Hence, we replace the candidate contract e w(P T ) with a new contract e w 0 (P T ), which pays o¤ w whenever e w(P T ) pays o¤ in the gain space and the stock price is below e P , and which pays o¤ w whenever e w(P T ) pays o¤ in the loss space and the stock price is above e P . The alternative contract therefore has l 0 (P T ) = l(P T ) and: By construction, the costs to the principal of both contracts are identical. To see this, note that losses in the candidate contract are replaced with an expected payo¤ w if P T > e P , which increases the expected costs of the contract by s(w w). At the same time, gains in the candidate contract are replaced with a payo¤ w if P T e P , which reduces the costs of the contract by s(w w).
In the next step we show that the new contract e w 0 (P T ) relaxes the participation constraint as well as the incentive compatibility constraint.
Participation Constraint: We need to show that the following di¤erence is positive:
R l 0 (P T )V (w 0 G (P T )) + (1 l 0 (P T ))V (w 0 L (P T )) f (P T jb e)dP T (IA.8) R
[l(P T )V (w G (P T )) + (1 l(P T ))V (w)] f (P T jb e)dP T :
Substituting de…nitions (IA.6) and (IA.7) and rearranging gives: where E h denotes expectations taken with respect to the density h and the substitution w = E h [w G (P T ) jb e ] follows from (IA.5). From Jensen's inequality and the strict concavity of the agent's preferences in the gain space, it follows that (IA.11) and by implication (IA.8) are strictly positive. We have therefore shown that the alternative contract e w 0 (P T ) costs the same as the candidate contract e w 0 (P T ), but it relaxes the participation constraint.
Incentive Compatibility Constraint: We de…ne the likelihood ratio LR(P T ) = f e (P T jb e)=f (P T jb e).
Then we repeat the same argument, where (IA.8) is replaced by:
R l 0 (P T )V (w 0 (P T )) + (1 g 0 (P T ))V (w 0 (P T )) LR (P T jb e) f (P T jb e)dP T (IA.12) R
[l(P T )V (w(P T )) + (1 l(P T ))V (w(P T ))] LR (P T jb e) f (P T jb e)dP T > 0:
We assume that LR(P T ) is monotone in P T . So, the gains in the integrands in (IA.12) are multiplied by bigger numbers than the losses. Consequently, (IA.12) is also strictly positive, which shows that switching from the candidate contract e w(P T ) to the alternative contract e w 0 (P T ) also relaxes the incentive compatibility constraint. Hence, if there is no cut-o¤ between the gain space and the loss space, then we can always construct an alternative contract with higher payo¤s in the gain space above e P and lower payo¤s in the loss space below e P . This alternative contract always improves on the candidate contract, contradicting the assumption that the candidate contract is optimal.
C. Proof of su¢ ciency
This subsection shows that the functional form (19) from Proposition 1 is also a su¢ cient condition for the optimal contract. We have shown in the proof of Proposition 1 that b P exists and that it is …nite and unique. Therefore, to show that the …rst order conditions of the Lagrangian are su¢ cient, we only need to consider the simpli…ed problem where the threshold b P is already given. If the constraints (A.2) and (A.3) de…ne a quasiconcave set, then this simpli…ed problem has a unique solution. Together with the uniqueness of b P this implies that the full optimization problem also has a unique solution.
Consider the left hand side of the participation constraint (A.2) and de…ne:
Let w 1 (P T ) and w 2 (P T ) be two feasible contracts with g(w 1 (P T )) g(w 2 (P T )). The participation constraint (A.2) de…nes a quasiconcave set if g( w 1 (P T ) + (1 )w 2 (P T )) g(w 2 (P T )) for any
= g(w 1 (P T )) + (1 )g(w 2 (P T )) g(w 2 (P T )):
This proves quasiconcavity for the participation constraint (A.2). The proof is analogous for the incentive compatibility constraint (A.3) and shows that the solution is unique.
Finally, the solution must be a minimum, because it is associated with …nite costs; as the objective function is linear and there are no upward restrictions, a maximum would involve in…nite costs.
Therefore, equation (19) is also a su¢ cient condition for the optimal contract.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
Total di¤erentiation of equation (A.17) yields:
The sign follows from w R > w and because condition (A.17) can then only be satis…ed if 0 + 1 ln b P >
0.
Di¤erentiating the optimal contract in the gain space twice gives:
@P 2 T = 0 de…nes the in ‡ection point above which w (P T ) becomes concave. From (IA.16), this is the case when the bracketed expression is zero, so P I T = exp ( = (1 ) 0 = 1 ).
II. Additional empirical material
The next subsection produces the complete version of two tables that are reported in the paper in a condensed format. The remaining seven sections contain detailed results for the robustness checks mentioned in the paper.
A. Extended tables from the paper we refer to these tables with the same numbers as in the paper and use the pre…x "A". There are no tables with the numbers A.I, A.III, or A.IV.
B. CARA utility function
We repeat our analysis with the risk-aversion model where the agent has constant absolute riskaversion (CARA) instead of constant relative risk-aversion (CRRA):
where W 0 denotes wealth and the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. (18)). We numerically calculate the optimal linear contract for the LA-model with the reference wage given by and for the CARA-model with parameter e and compare the two contracts across CEOs in Table   B .II. The results are very similar to the results shown in Table III . Table B.III contains our results for Table III when we split the sample according to CEO ownership. Table B .III, Panel A shows the results for the 54 owner-executives who own 5% or more of the shares of their …rm, and Panel B shows the results for the remaining 541 CEOs who own less than 5% of their …rm. We discuss this robustness check in Section V of the paper.
C. Owners versus managers
D. Restrict salaries and option holdings to be non-negative Table B .IV displays the results for Table III when we repeat our analysis and require that salary and option holdings cannot become negative, i.e. 0 and n O 0. We discuss this robustness check in Section V of the paper.
E. Remove outliers
We remove two outliers from our sample (Warren Bu¤ett and Steven Ballmer) and reproduce three tables for the sample without these outliers: the descriptive statistics from Table I, the results   for the piecewise linear contract from Table III , and the results for the non-linear LA-contract from 
F. Biases in our sample
To analyze the biases in our sample, we break down our results from Tables III and IV 
G. Analysis for 1997
We repeat our analysis for 1997 instead of 2005. 
H. Wealth robustness check
We multiply our wealth estimate W 0 by 0.5 and repeat our analysis from We discuss this robustness check in Section V of the paper. π is the market value of her observed compensation package. The table shows the median of the three parameters of the optimal contract, namely base salary φ*, stock holdings n S *, and option holdings n O *. It also shows the mean of the scaled errors:
where σ φ , σ S , and σ O denote the cross-sectional standard deviations of base salaries, stock holdings, and option holdings, respectively, and where superscript 'd' denotes parameter values from the observed contract. The table also shows the mean and median of the distance metric D from equation (17). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems.
Salary (φ)
Stock ( Table III if the manager exhibits constant absolute risk-aversion (CARA) utility instead of constant absolute risk-aversion (CRRA). It compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant absolute risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract. Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Table III when we split our sample according to the stock ownership of the CEOs. Panel A displays the results for CEOs who own more than 5% of their firm's equity, while Panel B displays the corresponding results for the remaining CEOs in our sample. The table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the distance metric D for the LA-model (see equation (17)), the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the Ttest for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Table III with the stricter constraints that option holdings and salaries must be non-negative (n O 0, 0). The table compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the distance metric D for the RA-model (see equation (17)), the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Table III after two outliers (Warren Buffett and Steven Ballmer) have been removed. It compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. (20)), the incentives from dismissals that are generated by the drop to the minimum wage w, and the mean inflection quantile, which is the quantile at which the curvature of the optimal wage function changes from convex to concave. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by θ. Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. All panels compare the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. (20)), the incentives from dismissals that are generated by the drop to the minimum wage w, and the mean inflection quantile, which is the quantile at which the curvature of the optimal wage function changes from convex to concave. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by θ. Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. n . Each panel shows the result for one of the quintiles from the lowest option holdings (Panel A) to the highest option holdings (Panel E). All panels compare the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. n . Each panel shows the result for one of the quintiles from the lowest option holdings (Panel A) to the highest option holdings (Panel E). All panels describe the optimal non-linear loss-aversion contract. The table shows the median change in wealth if the stock price changes by -50%, -30%, +30%, or +50%. In addition, the table shows the average dismissal probability, defined as the probability with which the contract pays the minimum wage w (from equation (20)), the incentives from dismissals that are generated by the drop to the minimum wage w, and the mean inflection quantile, which is the quantile at which the curvature of the optimal wage function changes from convex to concave. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by θ. Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. 
Table B.XIII: Comparison of loss-aversion model with matched risk-aversion model for the year 1997
This table contains the results from repeating the analysis shown in Table III for the year 1997. It compares the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal risk-aversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the distance metric D for the LA-model (see equation (17)), the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model, and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Table III when we decrease or increase our wealth estimates by a factor of two. For Panel A, our wealth estimate W 0 is multiplied by 0.5. For Panel B, it is multiplied by 2. Both panels compare the optimal loss-aversion contract with the equivalent optimal riskaversion contract where each CEO has constant relative risk aversion with parameter , which is chosen such that both models predict the same certainty equivalent for the observed contract (equation (18)). Contracts are piecewise linear. The table shows the average equivalent , the mean and median of the difference between the metric D between the RA-model and the LA-model (see equation (17)), and the frequency of this difference being positive. The table also shows the frequency of positive optimal option holdings, the frequency of positive optimal salaries, and the frequency of both (options and salary) being positive. Results are shown for eleven different reference wages parameterized by from equation (16). Some observations are lost because of numerical problems. ***, **, * denote significance of the T-test for zero mean and, respectively, the Wilcoxon signed rank test for zero median at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
